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Case management centres (CMCs) are part of the out-
break control plan for Ebola virus disease (EVD). A CMC 
in Sierra Leone had 33% (138/419) of primary admis-
sions discharged as EVD negative (not a case). Fifteen 
of these were readmitted within 21 days, nine of which 
were EVD positive. All readmissions had contact with 
an Ebola case in the community in the previous 21 
days indicating that the infection was likely acquired 
outside the CMC.
Between 26 June and 1 September 2014, 138 patients 
were discharged from the Kailahun Ebola case man-
agement centre (CMC) in Sierra Leone, as non-Ebola 
virus disease (EVD) cases, because they tested nega-
tive for the virus by polymerase chain reaction (PCR). 
Of these, 15 returned to the CMC within 21 days of their 
first admission and subsequently nine tested positive 
for Ebola virus. This raised the question as to whether 
CMCs could be acting as potential amplifiers of infec-
tion even though appropriate infection control meas-
ures are being followed. Such a question is of public 
health importance to the overall future control of the 
EVD outbreak, which is ongoing in West Africa [1]. To 
our knowledge, there is no literature available which 
describes the evolution of readmissions to Ebola CMCs 
during an outbreak and this paper addresses that 
deficit.
Ebola virus disease outbreak in West Africa
The current EVD outbreak in West Africa commenced in 
Guinea in December 2013 [1] and since then has spread 
to Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria and Senegal [2]. It is 
the largest EVD outbreak recorded in history [2] with 
6,553 (suspected, probable and confirmed) cases and 
3,083 deaths reported as of 23 September 2014 in 
affected countries [2]. The World Health Organization 
(WHO) declared the outbreak a public health emer-
gency of international concern on 8 August 2014 [3].
During EVD outbreaks transmission via infected body 
fluids occurs in three settings: (i) community, through 
contact with an infected person or contaminated 
fomites, (ii) burials, due to touching dead bodies, and 
(iii) nosocomial, via lack of infection control measures 
within healthcare facilities. In particular, the latter 
two settings [4] can quickly amplify an Ebola epidemic 
[5,6]. The incubation period of the virus ranges from 
two to 21 days [5,7].
Description on the Kailahun Ebola case 
management centre
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) have six Ebola CMCs 
operational in West Africa, one of which is based in 
Kailahun, Sierra Leone. Suspected, probable and con-
firmed case definitions are equivalent to those used by 
the WHO [8]. In brief, a suspected case is any person, 
alive or dead, who has (or had) sudden onset of high 
fever and had contact with a person with suspected, 
probable or confirmed EVD or with a dead or sick ani-
mal; any person with sudden onset of high fever and at 
least three of the following symptoms: abdominal pain, 
anorexia, arthralgia, diarrhoea, dysphagia, dyspnoea, 
headache, hiccupping, lethargy, myalgia, or vomiting; 
or any person who had unexplained haemorrhagic 
symptoms or who died suddenly from an unexplained 
cause. A probable case is any person suspected to have 
EVD who was evaluated by a physician or any person 
who died from suspected EVD and had an epidemiolog-
ical link with a confirmed case but was not tested and 
did not have laboratory confirmation of the disease. 
Suspect or probable cases are classified as confirmed 
when they had a positive laboratory test for EVD.
The Kailahun CMC (KCMC) is divided into a high risk 
zone and a low risk zone (Figure 1). The low risk zone 
includes the medical and nursing administrative tents, 
laundry area, storage area and other necessary facili-
ties to support the high risk zone. Within the high risk 
zone personal protective equipment (PPE) must be 
worn at all times. The high risk zone comprises: a sus-
pected cases ward, a probable cases ward and eight 
confirmed cases wards. A barrier fence separates the 
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confirmed cases wards from the suspected and proba-
ble cases wards preventing patient interaction between 
these two types of wards. 
 
Following medical assessment in triage, patients are 
referred to the suspected or probable cases ward 
depending on their case classification. An EVD PCR 
test (developed in-house by the Public Health Agency 
of Canada) on a blood sample is then performed. If this 
is positive the patient is transferred to the confirmed 
cases ward for further medical support while a nega-
tive result allows the patient to be discharged from 
the CMC. When a patient has a negative PCR result but 
symptom duration of less than 72 hours, a repeat PCR 
test is performed at 72 hours or more of symptoms to 
rule out a false negative result [9]. A patient can spend 
from less than 24 hours up to three days in the sus-
pect/probable section of the CMC while awaiting the 
exclusion or confirmation of EVD. When PCR negative 
patients are discharged, they are considered exposed, 
and are added to the contact list. Patients who are dis-
charged negative for EVD (not a case) from the suspect/
probable wards have the potential to be readmitted at a 
later date, and test either positive or negative for EVD. 
When readmissions test positive, they can cause anxi-
ety among medical staff as they try to decipher if the 
patients have had any other EVD contact history apart 
from their previous primary assessment in the CMC. 
Collection of readmission data at the 
Kailahun Ebola case management centre 
and data analyses
A patient register is maintained at the KCMC. It con-
tains basic demographic, epidemiological, medical, 
laboratory and outcome data for each patient admitted 
to the facility in Excel 2010 format. All data are stored 
in a secure manner. To be classified as a readmission a 
patient must have at least two admission episodes to 
the CMC that have identical first name, surname, age, 
sex and address information. All patient readmissions 
since 26 June 2014 with their corresponding original 
admissions were extracted from the database. No time 
limit was imposed on the interval between admission 
and corresponding readmission when selecting cases. 
Outcomes for patients were classified as one of the fol-
lowing: cured, dead or not a case. Cured patients had 
been admitted with a positive EVD PCR and ultimately 
discharged alive with a negative EVD PCR. Patients 
classified as dead, had a positive EVD PCR at admis-
sion and subsequently died in the CMC from EVD-
related complications. The not a case outcome referred 
to patients who were admitted to the suspect or prob-
able wards, tested negative for the virus by EVD PCR 
and were then discharged from the CMC.
The crude readmission ratio (CRR) was calculated as 
the total number of readmissions as a proportion of all 
‘not a case’ primary discharges. Furthermore, the posi-
tive readmission ratio (PRR) was defined as the number 
Figure 1
Outline map of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Ebola case management centre (CMC)
Source: Sterk E. Filovirus haemorrhagic fever guideline. Geneva: Médecins Sans Frontières; 2008.
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of readmissions with a positive EVD PCR as a propor-
tion of all ‘not a case’ primary discharges.
This study fulfilled the MSF Ethics Review Board 
(Geneva, Switzerland) approved criteria for analysis 
of routinely collected anonymous programme data. 
All activities conducted by MSF were approved by the 
national authorities of Sierra Leone.
Results
Between 26 June and 1 September 2014 (study period), 
there were 419 primary admissions at the KCMC. Of 
these, 278 (66%) were EVD PCR positive and 138 (33%) 
were EVD PCR negative. Three (<1%) admitted patients 
did not stay long enough in the centre to be tested 
for EVD (defaulters). During the same period there 
were 16 readmissions at KCMC. One readmission was 
Figure 2
Distribution of readmissions to the Ebola case management centre (CMC), Kailahun, Sierra Leone, 26 June–1 September 2014 
(n=15 readmissions)
EVD: Ebola virus disease.
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Table 1
Primary admission and corresponding readmission outcomes, Ebola case management centre (CMC), Kailahun, Sierra Leone, 
26 June–1 September 2014 (n=15)
Patient 
number
Primary admission Secondary admission (readmission)
Time between 
symptom 
onset and 
admission
LOS EVD PCR result Outcome
Time between 
symptom 
onset and 
admission
LOS EVD PCR result Outcome
1 Unknown 2 days Negative Not a case Unknown 22 days Positive Cured
2 0 day 3 days Negative Not a case 2 days 5 days Positive Death
3 1 day 2 days Negative Not a case 1 day 3 days Negative Not a case
4 1 day 2 days Negative Not a case 1 day 7 days Positive Death
5 8 days 1 day Negative Not a case 1 day 4 days Negative Not a case
6 2 days 2 days Negative Not a case 1 day 14 days Positive Death
7 3 days 1 day Negative Not a case 3 days 21 days Positive Cured
8 1 day 3 days Negative Not a case 3 days 2 days Positive Death
9 9 days 3 days Negative Not a case 2 days 23 days Positive Cured
10 0 day 2 days Negative Not a case 6 days 2 days Negative Not a case
11 3 days 1 day Negative Not a case 4 days Current inpatient Positive Current inpatient
12 3 days 1 day Negative Not a case 1 day 7 days Positive Death
13 5 days 6 hours Not performed Defaulter 4 days 1 day Negative Not a case
14 1 day 3 days Negative Not a case 3 days 1 day Negative Not a case
15 1 day 2 days Negative Not a case 1 day 3 days Negative Not a case
EVD: Ebola virus disease; LOS: length of stay; PCR: polymerase chain reaction.
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discordant for age (14 years versus 24 years) when com-
pared with the original corresponding admission and 
was excluded from the analysis. The remaining 15 met 
the criteria to be defined as readmissions as described 
in the methodology. Taking these 15 readmissions into 
account, the KCMC had a total of 434 admissions dur-
ing the study period, of which 239 (55%) were male. 
The mean age of admissions was 29.9 years and 106 
(24%) were aged 18 years or less.
All 15 readmissions had only one previous admission. 
One patient did not have an EVD PCR result upon the 
first admission, as this person left the centre before 
testing could be done. The 14 remaining readmis-
sions were all related to a prior admission whereby 
the PCR result was negative for EVD. The distribution 
of readmissions among all admissions to the KCMC is 
presented on the epidemiological curve in Figure2. It 
shows that four readmissions occurred during the first 
half of the outbreak while the remaining 11 presented 
in the second half.
 
Of the 15 readmissions, seven were male and four were 
aged 18 years or less. The mean age of readmissions 
was 27.9 years (range: 1.75–48 years). 
A positive EVD PCR test was obtained for nine readmis-
sions of which five died, three were cured and one is 
a current inpatient at KCMC (Table 1). The crude read-
mission ratio (CRR) for KCMC was 11% (15/138) while 
the positive readmission ratio (PRR) was 7% (9/138). 
The average length of stay (LOS) at the KCMC for pri-
mary admissions linked to any readmission was 1.9 
days (28/15) whereas the average LOS for primary 
admissions with corresponding EVD PCR positive and 
negative readmissions was 2 (18/9) and 1.7 (10/6) days 
respectively. Regarding the three readmissions who 
were cured, they had an average LOS after readmission 
of 22 days (66/3) while the five readmissions who died 
and six who were not a case had an average LOS of 
seven (35/5) and 2.3 (14/6) days respectively (Table 1).
The interval between discharge from primary admis-
sion and follow-up readmission to the KCMC for all 
readmissions was an average of 9.4 days with a range 
from four to 21 days (Table 2). Cases 1 to 15 also had a 
documented epidemiological contact with a suspected 
or confirmed case of Ebola (excluding their primary 
admission to the KCMC) within the prior 21 days to their 
readmission to the KCMC (Table 2). The majority (10/15) 
of these epidemiological contact types were house-
hold followed by occupational (3/15) and funeral (2/15) 
(Table 2).
Discussion
In response to the current EVD outbreak in West Africa, 
numerous Ebola CMCs are operating concurrently in 
the region [3]. MSF has previously set the standard for 
constructing and managing these centres in remote 
African settings [9,10]. The literature indicates that 
hospitals with inadequate infection control procedures 
have previously augmented filovirus outbreaks while 
appropriately run CMCs help contain them [4]. The 
emerging situation in Sierra Leone of patients who 
were initially discharged as non-cases from the KCMC 
and then returning as EVD PCR positive cases within 
21 days has caused medical staff to question if CMCs 
are acting as potential amplifiers of infection during 
this outbreak even though appropriate infection con-
trol measures are being followed. Such a question is of 
public health importance to the overall future control 
of the outbreak.
This study has demonstrated that 7% of patients who 
were originally discharged as non-cases were readmit-
ted as EVD PCR positive cases. Notably all readmis-
sions occurred within 21 days of primary admission 
discharge, which is equivalent to the incubation period 
of EVD. This readmission’s timeframe raises the pos-
sibility of nosocomial infection having occurred during 
the primary admission. The average LOS for primary 
admissions linked to positive readmissions was two 
days, during which time patients were admitted to 
the suspect and probable wards of the CMC. Infection 
control measures are strictly enforced in these wards, 
which are separated by barrier fencing from the con-
firmed wards in order to minimise the risk of nosoco-
mial infection. Patients in the suspect/probable wards 
are encouraged to maintain a minimum distance from 
other patients at all times and not to touch or use items 
belonging to other patients. The number of cases per 
ward is capped to prevent overcrowding. Chlorine solu-
tion hand washing facilities are located at multiple 
points for patient and staff use. Patients can only be 
transferred from suspect/probable to confirmed wards 
and not vice versa to prevent spread of infection within 
the CMC. Hygienist staff regularly disinfects all areas 
within both the low and high risk zones. The implemen-
tation of strict infection control protocol in the suspect/
probable wards and the wider CMC in general reduces 
but can never eliminate the hazard of nosocomial EVD 
infection.
Importantly, all readmissions to the KCMC had docu-
mented epidemiological contacts with suspected or 
confirmed Ebola cases within the previous 21 days that 
did not include the original admission to the KCMC. This 
is a relatively reassuring finding as it acts as a counter 
weight to the fact that all readmissions occurred within 
the incubation period of EVD. The source of infection 
for positive readmissions is as likely to be the house-
hold, funeral and occupational contacts documented, 
as the primary admission to the KCMC. Positive read-
missions partly reflect the continuous intense trans-
mission of the virus in the surrounding community.
It is notable that patients who were discharged as not 
a case had an average LOS of almost two days in the 
suspect or probable wards. Unfortunately, it was not 
possible to distinguish between suspect and prob-
able admissions and readmissions, as this information 
was not sufficiently recorded on the case investigation 
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forms. Efforts are ongoing to collect this information in 
a more systematic manner in the field. There are mul-
tiple reasons for the LOS of almost two days including 
the lack of availability of a 24 hour laboratory service 
on-site to process blood samples and the restriction of 
the phlebotomy service to morning times only due to 
staff workload and safety concerns regarding perform-
ing venesection at night time. A proportion of newly 
admitted patients will require a repeat EVD PCR test 
if symptom duration has been less than 72 hours to 
rule out a false negative result [9]. In such cases the 
symptomatic patient will have to spend additional time 
in the suspect or probable ward until a repeat test is 
performed at the appropriate time. However, for newly 
arrived patients who already had a minimum of three 
days of symptoms, it is imperative that phlebotomy and 
laboratory analysis be performed as quickly as reason-
ably possible in order to prevent the risk of potential 
nosocomial EVD infection to patients who could be 
non-cases staying overnight in the suspect or probable 
wards. Ideally, phlebotomy and laboratory analysis at 
the CMC should be provided on a 24 hour basis where 
feasible. Furthermore, new bedside rapid diagnostic 
tests (RDT) for EVD that do not require phlebotomy are 
urgently needed. Such technology improves the timeli-
ness of diagnosis for patients and reduces the risk of 
infections for healthcare staff.
The epidemiological curve showed that the majority of 
readmissions occurred during the second half of the 
outbreak to date. Readmissions can only develop from 
the pool of discharged non-cases because EVD positive 
cases have immunity to the specific strain if they sur-
vive to discharge [11,12]. On further inspection of the 
epidemiological curve it appears that positive readmis-
sions have clustered following peaks in primary admis-
sions. The clustering of three positive readmissions 
between 15 and 21 July and five positive readmissions 
between 10 and 19 August occurred within 21 days of 
the primary admissions peaks on 2 and 3 July and on 
1 and 2 August respectively. The clustering of readmis-
sions following primary admission peaks within the 
EVD incubation period suggests the possibility of the 
presence of superspreaders of the virus.
This study has shown the importance of analysing CMC 
readmissions to understand what exposures contribute 
to positive readmissions and to detect potential noso-
comial EVD infection when no other sources of infec-
tion can be identified. For all positive readmissions 
described in this study an exposure, in addition to the 
primary admission, was identified within the EVD incu-
bation period.
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